Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses the various sacrifices which require libations; essentially all of them except for the firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, the Paschal offering, the sin offering, and the guilt offering, with which libations are not brought.

It is a well-known idea that in a time when the Temple is no longer standing, and one cannot bring sacrifices, the recitation and study of parts of the scripture and Talmud that discuss the laws of sacrifices are considered as if one is bringing a sacrifice (Menachos 110a). This idea is taken so seriously that there is a discussion and debate regarding whether one should say the portion describing the libations after each section, or whether a blanket paragraph covers it all (see Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 65, Magen Avraham, and Pri Megadim).

Related to this, Magen Avraham (beginning of Siman 48, OC) rules that when reciting the liturgy that contains the verses and teachings regarding the sacrifices, one must also stand, because the recitation of the relevant portions is considered a substitute for the Avodah. However, Tevuos Shor (Bechor Shor, Seder Korbanos 12) disputes this requirement. He argues that while the recitation of the relevant verses and teachings is considered as if he brought a sacrifice, the actual recitation is not considered an act of service.

No opinion can hold in an utterly absolute sense that the recitation counts like avodah, because what about being ritually impure or having a blemish—both of which disqualify a Kohen?

Furthermore, a non-Kohen is forbidden to perform the Avodah, so how is it permitted for a non-Kohen to recite?

I believe the answer is as follows: Any psul haguf (invalidation due to a physical or material matter) is not considered a problem, since by definition a non-Kohen is performing this substitute service. Impurity, blemishes, and not being of the priestly caste are all physical invalidations and not included in the requirements of this particular substitute sacrificial order. However, standing or not listing the correct combinations of ingredients or libations is not a physical invalidation but rather a flaw in the process, and therefore must be adhered to.

By way of analogy, in Tefillah Zakkah we recite that the fasting on Yom Kippur, and its consumption of the fats and blood volume of our body, should be considered as if we offered the fat and blood of a sacrifice on the altar. Clearly, we are not suggesting that we are literally a sacrifice and subject to all the requirements of sacrifices, such as not being blemished. Rather, we are asking that it count like a sacrifice.

Regardless, at its core, we see a fundamental dispute about whether the recitation and study of the relevant passages of sacrifices are considered, in merit, as if one brought the sacrifice as a substitute process, or are considered as if one is bringing the sacrifice in actuality. Even regarding the earlier quoted section of Tefillah Zakkah, and possibly the recitation of the Akeidah, the same philosophical dispute might apply. Is it considered in merit as if we sacrificed ourselves or our only child (Bereishis 22:12), or as if we actually did it? Similarly, the same dispute might be relevant regarding the teaching in Berachos (6a):

“Rav Ashi said: If a person intended to perform a mitzvah, but due to circumstances beyond his control, he did not perform it, the verse ascribes it as if he performed the mitzvah.”

Is it as if he really performed the mitzvah, or does he merely get credit as if he performed it?