Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses a situation where someone sold a forbidden food and the buyer consumed it. Is the buyer to be refunded because he was sold a product he never would have wanted, or since he consumed it, in the end he received the benefit?

“In the case of one who slaughters a firstborn animal and sells its meat, and it was discovered that he did not initially show it to one of the Sages, the halakha is that it was actually prohibited to derive any benefit from the meat. In that case, what the buyers ate, they ate, and the Sages penalized the seller in that he must return the money to them, which they paid for the meat that they ate. And with regard to that which they did not eat, that meat must be buried, and he must return the money that they paid for the meat that they did not eat.”

“And likewise, in the case of one who slaughters a cow and sells it, and it was discovered that it is a tereifa, what the buyers ate, they ate, and what they did not eat, they must return the meat to the seller, who may sell it to a gentile or feed it to the dogs, and he must return the money to the buyers.”

In actuality, if the meat was consumed, since the buyer received a benefit and cannot return the food, the seller should not have to refund him. But the rabbis penalized the seller and made him pay anyhow so as to discourage such trickery (see Rashi ibid).

This is in regard to food items that are biblically prohibited, however the Rambam (Laws of Sales 16:14) and Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 234:3) rule as follows in regard to items that are forbidden only due to rabbinic law: If the items are still in existence, then they are returned, and the seller must refund the buyer because it was a purchase under false premises. If the items were consumed, since the buyer did receive the nutritional benefits and pleasure of eating, there is no refund.

The Question is, ultimately, what is the difference between something prohibited under a rabbinic law versus something prohibited under Torah law? The Sm”a (ibid 4) offers two explanations. 1. Since the prohibition is only rabbinic, the rabbis did not treat it as severely, and therefore did not find a need to impose an extra legal financial penalty. 2. In the case where the buyer consumed something that was forbidden, according to Torah law, the pain of having violated those laws, even inadvertently without his knowledge, significantly detracts from the enjoyment to the extent that he could ask for a refund. On the other hand, he does not feel distress for violating a rabbinic law inadvertently.

This is an interesting psychological answer, that the standard of your typical Jewish person is that if he violated a Torah law, even by accident, it significantly ruins the pleasure to the extent that he could demand a refund from the seller. Yet we still have a question. Why would he not feel the same way about violating a rabbinic law?

The Nesivos Mishpat (ibid 3) answers that there is a fundamental difference between a rabbinic law and Torah law. When a Torah law is violated due to lack of knowledge, there is still a requirement to make penance and atonement. On the other hand when a rabbinic law is violated, even due to lack of knowledge, no atonement is required. This fundamental difference is why the buyer who consumed the food does not feel the same anguish, and therefore enjoys that rabbinically forbidden food to the extent that he cannot ask for a refund. Still, we might ask, why is it so that no forgiveness is required for an inadvertent violation of a rabbinic prohibition? Shu”t Toras Chessed (O.C. 31) explains when it comes to Torah prohibitions the object itself has a forbidden aura, something intrinsically toxic about it. And therefore the violation requires a purification, even if committed unintentionally. However, something that is forbidden due to rabbinic law is not intrinsically prohibited. Rather, it is upon the person to obey the rabbis and not violate their ordinances. The object itself has no intrinsic toxicity, spiritual or otherwise. Consequently, if there was a violation with no intent to disregard rabbinic law, then ipso facto there is no need for atonement.

One final question. Even if we were to argue that your average Jew would find violating a Torah law so disturbing that he cannot enjoy the food, why is this operational retroactively? Meaning to say, at the time he ate the food he did not know that there was any violation. If so, the pleasure was complete with no distraction. It is only after he finds out that he ate something that was forbidden, he retroactively experiences anguish. Yet, how does that detract from the pleasure? The simple answer might be that it’s not so much that it detracts from his pleasure in the past, but since he experiences an equal or greater distress and needs to seek atonement, the sum total of the purchase experience had no value, and therefore he’s entitled to a refund. 

I believe that there is a deeper answer that has psychological implications. Much of what we feel happy about or sad about is often in retrospect. That is to say, if our current state is occupied with a particular disappointment and pains that are related to a past event, even if the past event was experienced happily in the past, it becomes colored in our memory and the experience gets destroyed. I find this particularly true in relationships and I call it “telescoping”. If somebody is feeling good about a person, his memories from the past and their expectations of the future “telescope” in positive ways coloring the experiences. On the other hand, unfortunately, if he is in a painful state with said individual, his recollections of the past and expectations of the future become colored negatively in light of his current feelings. While this is subjective and not rational, in the world of emotions it is still valid. And if I’m correct in my understanding of this peshat, we see Torah wisdom’s keen insight and respect for human nature and subjective emotional states.