Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses the halachic and hashkafic implications of the legalities surrounding conspiring witnesses. There is a fundamental and intrinsic illogic to the law. On one hand, witnesses are considered the highest form of verification, and ordinarily, if two sets of witnesses contradict each other, it results in a stalemate. We cannot assume that one group is more credible than the other. Yet, if the second set of witnesses disqualifies the first indirectly—by claiming, “According to your testimony, you were in such and such a place observing the act, but we saw you at the same time in a totally different location”—the second set is believed, and the first set is punished in a unique way. Whatever they sought to inflict through their false testimony is now inflicted upon them. For instance, if they testified that someone owed $1000, now that they have been exposed as conspirators and liars, they must pay that sum. There is a presumption that this amount will be paid to the intended victims.

However, since there is an intrinsic lack of full legal rationale in this law, we consider the law of the conspiring witnesses to be unpredictable in certain areas of Halacha. It does not necessarily allow us to extrapolate or make inferences beyond what is literally stated. This is why, in our Gemara, there is an opinion that the witnesses are not retroactively disqualified. Even though we treat them as false witnesses going forward, there isn’t a logical consistency to this particular position, so we have no reason to assume that it applies to the past. The overarching question remains: why should we believe one pair of witnesses over another?

In an interesting application of this principle—that we cannot make extrapolations or deductions regarding the rules of conspiring witnesses—Sefer Yereim (168) raises an intriguing question. He notes that there is an assumption that the payment is made to the intended victims. Yet, since it’s not fully proven that the witnesses were false, and there is even an opinion in the Gemara (Makkos 2b) that payment is a penalty fine rather than actual reimbursement, there are implications. If the witnesses preemptively confess their sin, there would be no liability. Returning to Sefer Yereim’s question, where is the scriptural source or indication that the payment should go to the victims?

Sefer Daf al Daf quotes Rav Yisrael Salanter, who offers a psychological answer. Since the verse tells us to inflict upon the conspiring witnesses the same fate they plotted for the victim (Devarim 19:19), Rav Yisrael Salanter explains that they must suffer in the same way as the victim would have. He elaborates: It is a different feeling to make a payment to a court of law—though frustrating, it is still an impersonal transaction. On the other hand, to be deceitfully forced to give your hard-earned money to another person, who has been gloating in their cruel and manipulative behavior, is a different degree of pain and defeat. Since this is the pain the victim would have suffered, it is essential to do the same to the conspiring witnesses. This is why the payment must go to the victim and not to the court, as in an ordinary fine.

This insight from Rav Yisrael Salanter aligns with modern research on trauma. Studies indicate that when people experience interpersonal trauma, the incidence of PTSD symptoms is much higher compared to trauma caused by a natural disaster. In other words, trauma resulting from personal harm—such as being robbed or murdered—has a greater emotional impact than financial loss or death caused by a hurricane or other natural disaster.

Research reveals that the overall rate of PTSD is 15.9%, with variation depending on the type of trauma and gender. Boys exposed to non-interpersonal trauma are at the lowest risk (8.4%), while girls exposed to interpersonal trauma show the highest rate (32.9%) (Source: Alisic, E., Zalta, A. K., van Wesel, F., Larsen, S. E., Hafstad, G. S., Hassanpour, K., & Smid, G. E. (2014). Rates of post-traumatic stress disorder in trauma-exposed children and adolescents: meta-analysis. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 204, 335–340. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.bp.113.131227).

We may theorize that trauma disrupts a person’s sense of safety. When it comes from an interpersonal, malicious force, the pain is greater because it makes the world feel like a mean and unsafe place. On the other hand, natural disasters can be rationalized as impersonal events. For religious individuals who believe in a compassionate God, there is comfort in knowing that their prayers and/or repentance can have an effect on the future. However, when someone experiences interpersonal cruelty, it is much harder to restore their sense of safety. I believe the higher PTSD susceptibility among females—who are generally more relational—supports this hypothesis. Disruptions in their environment, especially those perceived as originating from hostility, lead to a greater lack of safety and relational disruption. Even natural disasters can be interpreted by someone with a relational perspective as a personal punishment from God, leading to fear and insecurity.

Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation

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